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I. INTRODUCTION
Broker-dealers and investment advisers, two types of financial service
providers, play an important role in helping retail investors organize their
finances, accumulate wealth, and manage their savings. In particular,
investors rely on broker-dealers and investment advisers for investment
            "   
The regulatory regime that governs the provision of investment advice to
retail investors is crucial in assuring that legal obligations of investment
advisers and broker-dealers match the expectation and needs of investors.
Though broker-dealers and investment advisers are regulated extensively,
the two financial professionals actually operate under different rules since
they are subject to different standards under federal law when providing
investment advice about securities and investment strategies.2
Hence, the regulatory schemes for investment advisers and brokerdealers are designed to protect investors through different approaches. In
the United States, investment advisers must adhere to the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, which calls on advisers to perform fiduciary duties
      " 3 While broker-dealers, are governed
for the most part by the Securities Exchange Act of 1933, Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, specific Exchange Act rules and Self-Regulatory
    !  4 The rules based on the Exchange Act
principles are constructed on principles of fairness and transparency.5
Yet, retail investors generally are not aware of the regulatory
differences between broker-dealer and investment advisers or their legal
implications. Many investors are confused by the different standards of
care that apply to broker-dealers and investment advisers.6 Hence, the
confusion has been a source of great concern for both regulators and
Congress.7 It has caused concern particularly because many financial
                  !
further blurring the line between broker-dealer and investment adviser
responsibilities.8

2

See STAFF OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY ON
INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 913 OF THE DODDFRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT i (Jan. 2011) ,
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf [hereinafter 913 STUDY] (discussing
the different regulatory regimes of broker-dealers and investment advisers).
3
Id. at iii.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id. at i.
7
Id.
8
913 STUDY, supra note 2, at 12.
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Consequently, on June 5, 2019, the Securities and Exchange
 % & $   "   l-1 under the
#  "  %    &9 Regulation Best
Interest established a new standard of conduct for broker-dealers meant to
strengthen investor protection by: (1) reinforcing the obligations that apply
to broker dealers when making an investment recommendation to retail
customers; and (2) reducing the possible harm to retail investors from
potential conflicts of interest.10 Through its new rule, the SEC sought to
(i) educate retail customers about the services offered by broker-dealers
and investment advisers to enable them to make informed decision; (ii)
provide transparency with respect to the standards of conduct applicable
to broker-dealers and investment advisers; and (iii) help fill the gap that
currently exists in the level of protection provided to each regime.11
This Article provides an overview of the rules and regulations
governing the standard of conduct of broker-dealers and investment
advisers and the impact Regulation Best Interest will have on the
investment recommendations made to retail customers. Part I will
introduce the regulatory differences between broker-dealers and
investment advisers. Part II will look at the creation of the two regulatory
frameworks governing broker-dealers and investment advisers and discuss
$!$'! try. Part III will
introduce Regulation Best Interest and explain the different components
to the rule. Finally, Part IV will look at what Regulation Best Interest
attempts to achieve, the notable gaps in the regulation, and propose
reasonable improvements to Regulation Best Interest.

II. PRIOR LAW AND PERSPECTIVE
A. The Creation of the Regulatory Frameworks Governing BrokerDealers and Investment Advisors
The legal framework for determining the regulatory authority that
governs broker- dealers and investment advisers begins with the
development of the Federal Securities Regulation and creation of the
SEC.12 Following the stock market crash of October 1929, public
9

17 C.F.R. § 240.15l-1 (2019).
Adopting Release 34-86031 (June 5, 2019) 4-5, www.sec.gov/rules/final/2019/3486031.pdf [hereinafter Reg BI Release] (discussing the release of regulation best interest).
11
David W. Soden & Cody J. Vitello, The New Standards for Investor Protection: An
Analysis of Regulation Best Interest, Form CRS and Two Interpretations of the US
Investment Advisers Act, IX 250 THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW, Sept. 19 2019.
12
See generally Richard J. Kubiak, Comment: Off-Regulation: Examining the SECs
and the DOLs Dissonant Regulation of Broker-Dealers, 68 Emory L.J. 369, 376 (2018).
10
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confidence in the markets plummeted and there was a general consensus
$$ "$  )$ " &"$!%,#$$!$"$#
needed to be restored.13 As a result, Congress enacted the Securities Act
   *%"$# $+  the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
* ( $+14 The Securities Act together with the Exchange Act,
which created the SEC, were designed to restore investor confidence in
the capital markets by providing investors with more reliable information
and clear rules of honest dealing.15
The Securities Act had two basic objectives: (1) require that investors
receive financial and other significant information concerning securities
being offered for public sale; and (2) prohibit deceit, misrepresentations,
and other fraud in the sale of securities.16 Further, a year later, the
Exchange Act empowered the SEC with broad authority over all aspects
of the securities industry.17 It included the power to register, regulate, and
oversee brokerage firms, clearing agencies, stock exchanges, and SROs
#% # $  %$ ") %$ "$) *  +18 The Act also
provided the SEC with disciplinary powers over regulated entities and
their associates persons.19 Yet, these two Acts left out a group of
professionals k '#*&#$$ &#"#+
Investment Advisers provide a wide range of investment advisory
services to clients. From individuals and families looking to plan for
retirement or grow their capital, clients seek the services of investment
advisers to help them evaluate their investment needs and provide ongoing
financial planning advice for a fixed fee.20 Investment Advisers are
 &")$&#$$ &#"# $  * &#"# $+21 Its
" $& *'# $  !" $$ $ !%  &#$ "# #$
!"$# ) !"# # !  " &# $"#  %$ #%"$#+22
Investment Adviser employees under the Advisers Act are regulated as
13
SEC, What We Do, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html#org (last visited
Nov. 3, 2019).
14
Id.
15
Id. (explaining that the Securities Act focused on companies publicly offering
securities for investment dollars (primary market), while the Exchange Act focused on the
people who sell and trade securities such as broker-dealers and exchanges (secondary
market)).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
SEC, supra note 13.
20
913 STUDY, supra note 2, at 6-7.
21
Id. (explaining that the Advisers Act resulted from a congressionally mandated study
conducted by the Commission of investment companies, investment counsel, and
investment advisory services).
22
Id. (citing S. Rep No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1960)).
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              ject to state statutes and
provisions under the Act. 23
Under the Advisers Act, a person falls within the meaning of an
           
or analyses, regarding securities; (2) is in the business of providing such
services; and (3) provides such services for compensation.24 An important
thing to note is that the Advisers Act excludes from its definition of
investment adviser any broker dealer: (i) whose investment advisory
      25 to the conduct of its business as a broker or
           
services.26 Thus, a registered representative of a broker-dealer is entitled
to rely on the broker-dealer exclusion of the Advisers Act if he or she is
providing advisory services to customers within the scope of his or her
employment as a broker-dealer.27
Though the fiduciary duty to which advisers are subject to is not
defined in the Advisers Act, in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., the Supreme Court construed the Advisers Act Section 206(1) and
(2) as establishing a federal fiduciary standard governing the conduct of
investment advisers.28 As such, under the Advisers Act, a fiduciary
standard applies to the investment ad      29
The fiduciary standard requires that the investment adviser must satisfy
               
               e to avoid
misleading clients.30 The duties of loyalty and care which require an
adviser to serve the best interest of its clients are fundamental to the
fiduciary standard.

23

Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
25
Id. at 15-16 (noting that solely incidental elements amounts to recognition that
broker-dealers give a certain amount of advice to their customers in the course of their
regular business and it would be inappropriate to bring them within the scope of the
Advisers Act).
26
913 STUDY, supra note 2, at 15-16 (noting that special compensation amounts to
clear recognition that a broker or dealer is specially compensated for rendering advice
should be considered an investment adviser and not excluded for the purview of the
Advisers Act).
27
Id. at 16.
28
See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,194 (1963) (noting that
the Act s legislative history leaves no doubt that Congress intended to impose enforceable
fiduciary obligations).
29
913 STUDY, supra note 2, at 22.
30
See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 193.
24
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Under the duty of care, investment advisers are required to provide
investment adv                   31 As
explained in more detail below, the duty of care is composed of various
sub-duties. First, an investment adviser has a duty to provide advice that
is in the best interest of the client.32 This means that an investment adviser
              
                    
           33 To have a reasonable
understand                     
                   
              34 Second,
under the duty of care, an investment adviser has a duty to seek best
               
selecting executing broker-dealers.35 Lastly, an investment adviser has a
           
course of the agreed upon relationship.36
Likewise, the duty of loyalty requires that an investment adviser not
           37 To meet its duty of
loyalty, an investment adviser is required to make full and fair disclosure
to its clients of all material facts relevant to the adviser-client relationship,
including the capacity in which the firm is acting with respect to the advice
provided, particularly when the firm is dually registered.38 An adviser
must also make full and fair disclosure of any conflict of interest and
       39       
an adviser is required to present the client with specific facts so that the
client is able to understand the material facts and any potential conflict of
interest to make an informed decision as to whether or not to provide
consent.40 Whether the disclosure is considered full and fair will depend
upon various things such as the nature of the client, the scope of the
services provided, and the material facts or conflicts.41
31

See
Adopting
Release
IA-5248
(July
12,
2019)
8,
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/ia-5248.pdf [hereinafter Fiduciary Interpretation]
(discussing the Commissions interpretation regarding the standard of conduct for
Investment Advisers after Regulation Best Interest.)
32
Id. at 12.
33
Id. at 13, 15.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 19.
36
Id. at 20.
37
Fiduciary Interpretation, supra note 31 at 21.
38
Id. at 22.
39
Id. at 23.
40
Id. at 24.
41
Id. at 25.
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Though most broker-dealers are not considered investment advisers
under the Advisers Act, they are subject to additional regulatory oversight
apart from the SEC. In 1938, the Maloney Act amended the Exchange Act
 #    $ -regulated voluntary national
associations of broker-  !   %42
Consequently, FINRA was created to protect investors and strengthen
market integrity through the regulation of its registered members.43
 &    $ "      
   %44 Thus, by law, every firm
and broker is required to register with FINRA.45
FINRA established standards of conduct that broker-dealer members
must adhere to when operating on behalf of clients.46  & 
2111, a broker-dealer could only recommend a transaction or investment
 "$        
  "   "!  %47
This means that a broker-dealer is required to choose from a selection of
suita  &    
objectives. 48 Yet, under this rule, unlike an investment adviser, a brokerdealer is not required to act in the best interest of its retail customer.49

B. Overview of the Current Regulatory Landscape
Today, many financial services firms offer both investment advisory
and broker-dealer services, allowing their employees to be dually
registered as investment adviser and broker-dealer representatives.50 The
dual registration model allows advisers to be affiliated with a broker dealer
for commission-based securities while separately meeting the standards of

42

Nat&l
Ass&n
of
Sec.
Dealers,
Inc.,
(1997),
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Corporate/p009762. pdf (last visited Nov. 3,
2019).
43
Press Release, FINRA, NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine to Form the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority - FINRA (July 30, 2007),
https://www.finra.org/media-center/news-releases/2007/nasd-and-nyse-memberregulation-combine-form-financial-industry (last visited Feburary 24, 2021).
44
Member Regulation, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/member-regulation (last
visited Nov. 3, 2019).
45
Id.
46
Rules and Guidance, FINRA,https://www.finra.org/industry/rules-and-guidance (last
visited Nov. 3, 2019).
47
See FINRA Manual, Contents: Rule 2111, FINRA (May 1, 2014),
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/2111 (last visited Nov. 3,
2019) [hereinafter FINRA Manual].
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
913 STUDY, supra note 2, at 12.
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a fee-based investment adviser.51 Dual registration also allows firms to
provide a variety of services to customers that would not be available if
those entities were solely registered as investment advisers or brokerdealers.52 Consequently, retail investors may have a number of different
accounts at a financial services firm that are subject to investment adviser
or broker-dealer regulations.53 Though having multiple accounts may
bring certain benefits to investors such as taking advantage of the different
forms of compensation paid to brokers-dealers and investment advisers,
they also present conflicts and confusion regarding the different
responsibilities dual registrants have towards retail investors.54
When acting as dual registrants, investment advisers and brokerdealers must adhere to different standards of conduct based on the role
they have chosen to take when interacting with their investor clients.55 As
previously mentioned, these standards of conduct are imposed by federal
securities laws, and in the case of broker-dealers, by self-regulatory
organizations, such as FINRA. 56 Therefore, when a dually registered
financial services            
he or she is in the business of providing investment advice for
compensation, the Investment Advisers Act controls.57
On the other hand, when a dual registrant acts solely as a broker-dealer
when interacting with investor clients, the Advisers Act does not apply58
since it excludes from the investment adviser definition any broker-dealer
               59 Thus, the disparity
that exists between the two regulatory frameworks is a source of great
concern for Congress regarding (1) the potential harm to retail customer
resulting from broker-dealer recommendations where conflicts of interests
exist, and (2) the insufficiency of broker-dealer regulatory requirements to
address these conflicts.60 In other words, Congress is concerned that
existing requirements do not require a broker- 
   
be in the best interest of the retail customer.
51

Sarah O Brien, Booming: The new dually registered advisor model, CNBC (Mar. 16,
2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/03/16/booming-the-new-dually-registered-advisormodel.html.
52
913 STUDY, supra note 2, at 12.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
See FINRA Rules, https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules (last
visited Nov. 4, 2019).
59
Opinion of the General Counsel Relating to Section 202(a)(11)(C) of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2 (Oct. 28, 1940).
60
913 STUDY, supra note 2, at 9.
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III. MAIN REGULATION AT HAND
A. The Emergence of Regulation Best Interest
On January 2011, the SEC conducted a study on investment advisers
and broker-dealers as required by Section 913 of the Dodd Frank Wall
*(* &($ % &%)+$( (&**!&% * /& (%" *061
Section 913 requires that the SEC conduct a wide-ranging study regarding
gaps or deficiencies in the regulation of broker-dealers and investment
advisers.62 Since these firms often perform similar functions but are
regulated differently, Congress set forth key items the SEC must consider
!% !*) )*+. !%#+!% /%. &* ( &%)!(*!&% *    $)
''(&'(!*063 In doing so, Congress gave the SEC new rulemaking
authority.64 **  1)%-+* &(!*.##) &(*&$'&-(!%!**&
+##.())* )*+.1)'&*%*!#!%!%))!%* '(&,!)!&%!%*%*&
address the gaps in the regulation had a gap of its own-a gap between the
issues the study found and the tools the SEC had been provided to solve
them.65
%#! *&* !%&%)!)*%!)*-%* )*+.1))&'%*  1)
%-(+#$"!%+* &(!*.* '(*$%*&&(/0**$'**&
expand the fiduciary rule for investment advisers under the Employee
*!($%* %&$ +(!*. * &   / 066 * *  1)
efforts to create a Fiduciary Rule came to a halt when the Fifth Circuit
Court concluded that the DOL had overreached its mission.67 In response
*&* '&#!*!#'())+()'(&$'*.*  &+(*1))'#!*-1 decision, the
SEC stepped up and proposed a new rule 15l-1 under the Exchange Act
on April 18, 2018. 68  !)%-(+#"%&-%)/+#*!&% )*%*()*0
61

See generally id.
Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. § 913.
124 Stat. 1376, 1824 (2010) (mandating study and rulemaking regarding obligations of
brokers, dealers, and investment advisers).
63
Id. at § 913(b)-(b)(1).
64
Id. at § 913(c) (explaining that the SEC could commence a rulemaking, as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of retail customers to address the
legal or regulatory standards of care for broker-dealers, investment advisers, and their
associated persons).
65
Id. (noting that in giving the SEC new rulemaking authority, Congress recognized the
need of additional legislation to reform the regulations of broker dealers and investment
advisers).
66
Id. (explaining that the DOL1s Fiduciary Rule, also known as the /Conflict of Interest0
rule, stated that advisers must give conflict free advice on retirement accounts, putting their
client1s needs ahead of their own potential compensation).
67
Alessandra Malito, The fiduciary rule is officially dead. What its fate means to you,
MARKETWATCH (June 25, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/is-the-fiduciaryrule-dead-or-alive-what-its-fate-means-to-you-2018-03-16.
68
Reg BI Release, supra note 10, at 9.
62
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sought to materialize the broad rule-making authority given to the SEC by
the Dodd Frank Act.
Regulation Best Interest proposed enhancements to the broker-dealer
standard of conduct when making recommendations to retail customers.69
Specifically, the regulation established an express best interest obligation
that would require all broker-dealers and associated persons, to act in the
best interest of the retail customer, at the time of recommending a security
transaction or investment strategy.70 Under this new regulation, a brokerdealer could not place its financial interest ahead of the interest of its
customers.71 This new standard of conduct established by Regulation Best
Interest emerges from key fiduciary principles, including those that apply
to investment advisers, yet does not impose a formal fiduciary standard for
broker-dealers.72 Rather, it requires that whether a retail investor chooses
a broker-dealer or an investment adviser (or both), the investor will be
entitled to receive an investment recommendation that is in his or her best
interest based on his or her financial needs and investment objectives.73
In response to its proposed release, the SEC received over 6,000
comment letters from individual investors, financial services firms, state
securities regulators, among others.74 Despite various concerns and
proposed recommendations to the rule, on June 5, 2019, the SEC voted 31 to approve a package of rules and regulations that would enhance the
           "      -dealers
and investment advisers.75 The rule became effective on September 10,
2019, and requires compliance by June 30, 2020.76

B. A Broker-  

        

Regulation Best Interest is composed of two parts: (1) an overall
provision setting forth that a broker-        "
best interest and cannot place its own interest ahead of the retail customers
          !      
compliance with specific sub-component obligations in order to satisfy the

69

Id.
Id.
71
Id.
72
Reg BI Release, supra note 10, at 68.
73
Id.
74
See Staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Regulation Best Interest,
Release No. 34-83062 1 (April 18, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2019/3486031.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2019) [hereinafter Proposel Rule].
75
Soden & Vitello, supra note 11.
76
Reg BI Interest, supra note 10, at 2.
70
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General Obligation standard.77 The General Obligation is satisfied only if
the broker-dealer complies with four specific sub-component obligations,
which include: the (i) Disclosure Obligation, (ii) Care Obligation, (iii)
Conflict of Interest Obligation, and (iv) Compliance Obligation.78 Thus, a
violation of any of the four sub-component obligations will lead to a
violation of the General Obligation.79 It is important to note that intent is
not required to establish a violation of the General Obligation.80
          
or at the time of [a] recommendation, reasonably disclose to the retail
customer, in writing, the material facts relating to the scope and terms of
the relationship with the retail customer and all material conflicts of
             81 Pursuant to this
obligation, the Reg BI Release noted that material facts include: (1)
whether the broker-dealer was acting in a broker, dealer, or associated
person capacity with respect to the recommendation; (2) fees and costs that
            
those fees are deducted (e.g., on a per transaction basis or quarterly); (3)
type and scope of services,82 and (4) conflicts of interest the customer
should know about.83 Though the form and manner of disclosure is flexible
under Regulation Best Interest, broker-dealers and investment advisers are
also required to deliver to retail investors the Relationship Summary.84 The
Relationship Summary is considered the initial layer of disclosure, with
the Disclosure Obligation reflecting more specific and additional detailed

77

Id. at 13 (discussing the enhancements to standard of conduct that applies when
broker-dealers make recommendations to retail customers, specifically the proposal of
Regulation Best Interest).
78
Id. at 15 (explaining that although Regulation Best Interest identifies specified
obligations with which a broker-dealer must comply in order to meet its General
Obligation, compliance with each of the component obligation of Regulation Best Interest
will be principles-based. In other words, whether a broker-dealer has acted in a retail
customers best interest will turn on an objective assessment of the fact and circumstances
at the time the recommendation is made).
79
See id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 130.
82
See id. at 14 (noting that type and scope of services includes the following examples
of facts that are deemed to be material and require disclosure: (1) whether a broker-dealer
had material limitations on the securities; (2) whether a broker-dealer provides account
monitoring and if so, its frequency; (3) whether a broker-dealer has any new account
balance requirements; (4) the general basis or strategy for a recommendation; (5) the
general risks associated with a particular recommendation).
83
Id.
84
See id. at 134 (explaining that the Relationship Summary provides information about
the relationship and services offered as well as fees and costs that the retail investor will
pay).
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layers of disclosure.85 Accordingly, the Disclosure Obligation encourages
investors to ask questions and request additional sources of information
when needed.86
Second, the Care Obligation requires that a broker-dealer, when
making a recommendation of any security transaction or investment
                      
               
the Care Obligation.87 These three components are the following: (1) a
Reasonable- Basis Component, which requires a broker-dealer to
understand the potential risks, rewards, and costs associated with a
                      
recommendation could be in the best interest of at least some retail
customers; (2) a Customer-Specific Component, which requires that a
broker-dealer must have reasonable basis to believe the recommendation
                  
 !             -Care Component,
which requires that a broker-dealer must have reasonable basis to believe
                !
best interest, when viewed in isolation, is not excessive.88 The Care
Obligation is considered the heart of Regulation Best Interest and was
intended to incorporate and enhance existing suitability requirements
applicable to broker-dealers under the federal securities laws.89
Third, the Conflict of Interest Obligation requires a broker-dealer to
establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures that are
reasonably designed to identify and address the effect of the broker !            90 At a minimum, a
broker-dealer is required to (1) disclose or eliminate, all conflict of
interests associated with a recommendation and (2) identify the material
facts associated with that conflict in order to establish specific
requirements with respect to the policies and procedures for the mitigation
and elimination of certain conflicts.91 These policies and procedures are
designed to address potential conflicts of interest and broker-dealers must
disclose the material limitations of the menu of securities when the conflict
stems from such limitation so that the conflict is either mitigated or
85

Id.
Id.
87
Id. at 245.
88
See id. at 245.
89
See id.
90
Soden & Vitello, supra note 11 (explaining that this obligation achieves greater
consistency with the treatment of conflicts under the Advisers Act since it requires that a
broker-dealer expose all conflicts of interest through full and fair disclosure).
91
Id.
86
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eliminated.92 In doing so, the Conflict of Interest Obligation is intended to
reduce the information asymmetry that exists between a retail customer
and broker dealer with respect to the bro%%0&"!'"!'%&'&
that may have an effect on the recommendation provided to the retail
customer.93 Thus, by having a process in place to identify and address
conflict of interests at the time of recommendation, retail customers can
make a better assessment of the efficiency of the recommendation they
receive.94
Fourth, the Compliance Obligation requires in addition to the policies
and procedures required by the Conflict of Interest Obligation, that brokerdealers establish, maintain, and enforce policies and procedures
.%&"!, &!/ '" ) " #! *' ('"! &'
Interest.95  " #!'"!.%'&!% ')"'"!
(!% ' +! '/ '" " #, *' ('"! &' !'%&' & 
whole by not only addressing conflicts of interests but also complying with
the Disclosure and Care Obligations.96 In addition, the Compliance
'"!%$(%&''% 0&#"&!#%"(%&.%&"!,
&!/ '" %&& ' .&"# &- ! %&& &&"' with the
operations of the firm and the types of businesses in which the firm
!&/97 Though the SEC does not mandate specific requirements to
the Compliance Obligation, a reasonably designed compliance program
!%, *"( !(  . % '"n of non-compliance; (2)
"!'%"& " #!'%!! !#%"%)*!'&'!/98
Additionally, in addition to its General Obligation and sub-component
"'"!&('"! &'!'%&'%$(%&"#'"!".%"%-making
and record k#!%$(% !'&/99 The requirements include a record of
all information collected from and provided to the retail customer when
recommending a security or investment strategy and retention of all
records and account information for at least six years.100 Examples of
%"% #! %$(% !'& (!% ' %( !( )!  .%'
(&'" % !)&' !' #%"&/ !  *%''! &"&(%& #%") '"

92

Id.
Reg BI Release, supra note 10, at 568.
94
Id. at 574.
95
Id. at 358.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 360.
98
Id.
99
Reg BI Release, supra note 10, at 361 (specifying minimum requirements with respect
to the records that broker-dealers must make, and how these records must be kept).
100
Id. at 369 (noting that the six-year minimum requirement is six years after the earlier
of the date the account was closed or the date on which the information was replaced or
outdated).
93
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customers.101 A broker-dealer does not need to maintain record on a
   -by-recommendatio           
explain in general terms the process by which the firm determines what
      !    
process would be applied to a particular recommendation.102
Finally, Regulation Best Interest has also incorporated Form CRS as
part of its requirements.103 Form CRS is a new question and answer, openended disclosure document that helps address investor confusion about the
nature of their relationship with investment professionals.104 Form CRS is
intended to provide retail investors with simple, easy to understand
information about: (1) the types of services offered; (2) applicable fees the
retail customer may pay; (3) the legal standard of conduct applicable to
the broker-dealer; (4) financial professional compensation; and (5) any
reportable disciplinary history the firm has.105 Form CRS must be written
!       
Best Interest requires that broker-dealers complete Form CRS and file it
electronically by June 30, 2020.106

C. What Regulation Best Interest Attempts to Achieve
Prior to June 5, 2019, when that SEC voted to adopt Regulation Best
Interest, broker-dealers were subject to a suitability standard under FINRA
Rule 2111.107         -dealers [and
their] associated persons have reasonable basis to believe that a
recommended transaction or investment strategy involving a security or
securities [was] suitable for the customer, based on information obtained
through reasonable [due] diligence . .        !
      108 In its decision to implement Regulation Best
Interest, the SEC sought to enhance the quality and transparency of
investors relationship with broker-dealers and investment advisers by
101

See Soden and Vitello, supra note 11.
Reg BI Release, supra note 10, at 204-05.
103
See
Adopting
Release
34-86032
(June
5,
2019)
1,
https:// www.sec.gov/rules/final/2019/34-86032.pdf [hereinafter Form CRS Release]
(discussing Form CRS Relationship Summary and Amendments to Form ADV).
104
Id. at 5.
105
Id. at 1.
106
Id. at 28.
107
See generally Reg BI Release, supra note 10.; see also The SEC Approves Regulation
Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, KING & SPALDING (June 27, 2019),
https://www.kslaw.com/news-and-insights/the-sec-approves-regulation-best-interest-thebroker-dealer-standard-of-conduct (explaining how the SEC approved Regulation Best
Interest by a 3-1 vote, with Commissioner Robert Jackson dissenting).
108
FINRA Rule 2111 (Suitability) FAQ, available at https://www.finra.org/rulesguidance/key-topics/suitability/faq (last visited Feb. 24, 2021).
102
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aligning the broker-                
reasonable expectations.109
Under Regulation Best Interest, broker-dealers and their associated
persons are required to act in the best interest of the retail customer at the
time an investment recommendation is made. 110 Broker-dealers are also
required to address conflicts of interest by establishing procedures that are
reasonably designed to identify and fairly disclose material facts about
potential conflicts of interest, and in certain cases are prompted to mitigate
or eliminate the conflict.111 As a result, Regulation Best Interest is
expected to enhance the efficiency of the recommendations broker-dealers
make to retail customers since retail customers will be able to better
analyze the recommendations received and make informed decisions.112
Yet, it is important to note that Regulation Best Interest specifically
stated that it would not apply to investment advice provided to a retail
customer by a dual-registrant when acting in the capacity of an investment
adviser, even if the retail investor has a brokerage relationship with the
dual-registrant.113                 
        mine the capacity in which a
dual-registrant makes a recommendation.114 Specific factors would
include: (1) the type of account; (2) how the account is described; (3) the
type of compensation; and (4) the extent to which the dual-registrant made
clear to the customer the capacity in which it was acting.115 Thus, the
          
             
      ificant gap in the standard
of conduct of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers.

IV. ANALYSIS
A.

The Notable Gaps Left by Regulation Best Interest

              
and a broker-        lation Best Interest sound very
109

Reg BI Release, supra note 10 at 373.
Id.
111
Id. at 374.
112
Id. (noting that [w]hile a suitable recommendation must take into account the
elements of a retail customers investment profile that make securities transactions or an
investment strategy efficient for that particular retail customer, this requirement for
suitability may not always lead to an efficient result for the retail customer).
113
Form CRS Release, supra note 103, at 67-69.
114
Id. at 71.
115
See generally id. at 67-78.
110
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"! ""#'"##&##&"#!"!## +"
interpretation, a broker-!+" "#!  $# #" $!
$# "# #!"# ! )! !"! #%* #  %"##
%"!+" )$!( $#( #"* & ! ! "-based.116
Regulation Best Interest requires that a broker-dealer act in the best
#!"#  #" !#$"#!")#  #" & #!"#" *
when making securities recommendations to its retail customers.117
However, the general obligation of putting #" !# $"#!"+ "#
#!"#!"#(%("#"($#"# #!"#+"
$! !"! #% #" # )""$! #* # )!
#*#)# #!"# #*#) 
Obligati*118 On the other hand, the Investment Adviser Act is based on
#& ! " # )$#(  !*  )$#(  (#(* &
 ""#)%!! ! *###)#"##!"#*
of a client.119 Though similar, these two obligations can be interpreted
quite differently, particularly because Regulation Best Interest does not
include an explicit duty of loyalty.120 Thus, the lines are blurred as to when
a broker-dealer must make full and fair disclosures and provide account
monitorin#!#$"#!+"$#$!$#"# #!"#

1. A Broker-!"+$#" ##!# !"
Investment Discretion
First, unlike the Advisers Act, Regulation Best Interest limits broker!"+ $#" # !# !"  %"tment discretion. For example,
though the SEC believes that when a broker-dealer has discretion over a
$"#!+"$##!#" ""!!#!"#"###
an investment adviser under the Advisers Act, the SEC has taken the
position ### !!("!#!($#!#("!)"(
#*##!!-!+"$"""121 If a broker-!+"%
is considered solely incidental, then it excluded from the definition of an

116

Anna Young Black, Richard T. Choi, Ann Began Furman, Thomas C. Lauerman &
Chip Lunde, Unpacking the SECs Regulation Best Interest Package, THE NATIONAL
REVIEW (2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/unpacking-sec-s-regulation-bestinterest-package (last visit Dec. 27, 2019).
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Fiduciary Interpretation, supra note 31, at 8.
120
Black et al., supra note 116 (noting that a duty of loyalty requires that an investment
adviser provide frequent advice and monitoring that is consistent with the adviser-client
relationship).
121
See Soden & Vitello, supra note 11.
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         e that a broker-dealer owe a
fiduciary duty to its retail customer. 122
Though the SEC will consider the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether an advice was solely incidental, it has provided certain
examples of temporary or limited investment discretion.123 The SEC also
requires that a broker-dealer not receive special compensation for such
services. 124 Examples of temporary or limited investment advice include:
(1) discretion as to the price or time at which to execute an order, (2)
discretion, on an infrequent basis, to purchase or sell a security when a
customer is unavailable, (3) discretion to purchase or sell securities to
satisfy margin requirements, (4) discretion to purchase or sell a security
limited by specific parameters established by the customer, among other
things, (5) discretion as to cash management, and (6) discretion to
purchase a bond with a specified credit rating and maturity date . 125
Consequently, if these situations apply, a broker-dealer will not owe a
fiduciary duty to its retail customer. Hence, under Regulation Best Interest,
instances likes the ones mentioned above limit a broker-    
obligations towards its retail customers.

2. No Duty to Provide Ongoing Advice and Monitoring
Second, under Regulation Best Interest, a broker-   
do not extend beyond a particular recommendation since a broker- 
                     
   126 Hence, Regulation Best Interest does not require a
      directed or unsolicited orders.127 This gap is particularly important because
the duty to monit      
Unlike, broker-dealers, investment advisers under the Advisers Act have
a duty to provide advice and monitoring that is relatively extensive and
consistent with the nature of the relationship. In doing so, investment
122

Id.
Adopting
Release
IA-5249
(June
5,
2019)
17,
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/ ia-5249.pdf [hereinafter, Solely Incidental
Interpretation Release].
124
Id. at 2.
125
Id. at 17.
126
See Reg BI Release, supra note 10, at 60.
127
Fiduciary Interpretation, supra note 31, at 10 (explaining that the specific obligations
that flow from the advisers fiduciary duty depend upon what functions the adviser, as
agent, has agreed to assume for the client, its principal. For example the obligation of an
adviser providing comprehensive, discretionary advice in an ongoing relationship with a
retail client . . . [is] different from the obligations of an adviser [providing advice] to a
registered investment company or private fund where the contract defines the scope of the
relationship).
123
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advisers are required to review the performance of the account, make
appropriate changes to the portfolio, and evaluate whether a program type
continues to be in the best interest of the client.128 Though a broker-dealer
can agree to provi"##!" #!" )!#"$ &
review of the account without a recommendation to sell is considered an
'"( "129

3. The Continued Existence of Broker-Dealer Compensation
Model
Third, the sustained existence of a transaction-based (e.g.,
commission) compensation structure for broker-dealers under Regulation
Best Interest, provides a continued incentive to a broker-dealer to seek its
own compensation or other financial interest at the expense of the
customer to whom it is making investment recommendations.130 Though
" "  " !" " # ! ""     $ '"
 ($" !" #   -dealer to recommend the
'!!"( '!"!"&(!!" natives that might exist
! "" "$""'!"" !"(" "
customer.131 Further, under Regulation Best Interest, the SEC does not
require an associated person of a broker- "' %"$ &
product on a broker- )!" (132

4. "#!" )!  $!"" %
Fourth, it is important to note that while Regulation Best Interest seeks
to enhance the efficiency of the recommendations broker-dealers make to
retail customers, many retail customers may not always have the
investment knowledge or time to identify efficient strategies on their
own.133 In addition, investors may have limited access to information that
would allow them to properly evaluate investment choices.134 This is due
to the fact that the efficiency of an investment recommendation depends
on various factors, such as : (1) the menu of investment products and
strategies that a broker-dealer and its associated persons consider when
making an investment recommendation, (2) the return and costs of the
 !# "!  !" "!  " !!"  !)!
128

See Barbara Black, Brokers and Advisers  Whats in a Name?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP.
& FIN. L. 31, 38 (2005).
129
Reg BI Release, supra note 10, at 13.
130
See id. at 6-7.
131
Black et al., supra note 116.
132
Id.
133
Reg BI Release, supra note 10, at 378.
134
Id.
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 (  % $ $&#%$  $%#%$  % #% &$% #.$
%'$  #$ % #   % #% &$% #.$ 
constraints.135 &$%$!# %%&%  $% %#$%.$ #%$% 
provide more information to investors and raise the standard of conduct
for broker-dealers, may fall short since retail customers will likely still
follow a broker-#.$'(% &%ing an informed decision.136

B.

Investor and State Response to Regulation Best Interest

Regulation Best Interest is expected to have important implications on
broker-#  '$%% '$# -$ # % $ %  #%
customers. Yet, its impact on consumer protection remains uncertain
&$ % &%  $% %#$% +#%$  & $%# %%
)! $$  $  #$ %  %  $%$  % ',137 As
Commissioner Jackson, the sole dissenter to the rule explained,
+&%  st Interest] fails to require that investor interest come first,
$%% !%#&-#$#% & &$ &%"&$%  
(%#$ &  &$ .,138 $ $ +#&
relies on a weak mix of measures that are unlikely to make a difference in
!# '%"&%* ''$% #$#'# %## #$,139
% .$$ %  !%&%  $% %#$%'$% #
confusion and criticism has heightened. Seven states and the District of
Columbia have sued the SEC and agency Chairman Jay Clayton to
overturn Regulation Best Interest.140 Attorney Generals for the states of
New York, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Mexico, and
Oregon have filed lawsuits in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York seeking to vacate Regulation Best Interest.141 In the
Complaint, states allege that the SEC exceeded its statutory authority in

135

Id. at 380-381.
See id. at 378.
137
The Investment Management Practice, SEC Adopts Rules & Interpretative Guidance
Designed to Enhance and Clarify the Obligation of Financial Professionals, PAUL
HASTINGS.,
https://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id=5ddb3c6d2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbded.
138
Id.
139
Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Statement on Final Rules Governing Investment Advice,
SEC.GOV (June 5, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-jackson060519-iabd.
140
Greg Iiacurci, SEC Sued by Seven States to Kill Reg BI Investment-Advice Rule,
NEWS
(Sep.
10,
2019),
INVESTMENT
https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20190910/FREE/190919999/sec-sued-byseven-states-to-kill-reg-bi-investment-advice-rule.
141
Id. ( +Massachusetts, New Jersey and Nevada have proposed rules to require a
fiduciary standard of care for broker-dealers.,).
136
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violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.142 The Administrative
Procedure Act governs the process by which federal agencies such as the
SEC, develop and issue regulations.143 More specifically, plaintiffs allege
that the SEC failed to implement a uniform standard of conduct.144 In
doing so, the SEC increased the risk of harm to retail investors because
they cannot always differentiate the proper standard of conduct that
applies when they get an investment recommendation from a broker-dealer
vs. a registered investment adviser.145
Furthermore, a few weeks after Regulation Best Interest was adopted,
the U.S House of Representative passed legislation prohibiting the SEC
from implementing and enforcing Regulation Best Interest when a brokerdealer is making an investment recommendation to a retail customer.146 In
addition, various state legislatures and state securities regulators have
taken steps to adopt a uniform fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and
investment advisers at the local level.147 So far, states like Massachusetts,
Nevada, New Jersey, and New York have all taken steps to require greater
levels of disclosure or have sought to impose a uniform fiduciary standard
on all investment professionals.148
Yet, one important issue left unaddressed by the SEC is whether state
fiduciary rules would preempt the federally promulgated Regulation Best
Interest.149 In its passing of Regulation Best Interest, the SEC did not take
a position regarding preemption and chose to defer that issue to the judicial
branch.150        preemptive effect of Regulation Best
142
143

Id.

See Promoting the Rule of Law Through Transparency and Fairness in Civil
Administrative Enforcement and Adjudication, 84 Fed. Reg. 55239 (Oct. 19, 2019)
(explaining that the APA includes requirements for publishing notices of proposed and
final rulemakings in the Federal Register and provides opportunities for the public to
comment on notices of proposed rulemaking).
144
Iacuri, supra note 140.
145
Id. (explaining that investor confusion is caused by the fact that the rule makes it easier
for brokers to market themselves as trusted advisers while still being able to give
conflicted advice).
146
Mirella DeRose et al., Regulation Best Interest: Updates and Developments, JD
SUPRA (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/regulation-best-interestupdates-and-97361/ (explaining that the legislation passed is a funding bill for various
federal agencies, including the SEC. The bill includes an amendment that would prohibit
regulators from moving forward with the controversial Regulation Best Interest.).
147
Id.
148
Id. (clarifying that the fiduciary standards these states seek to impose include requiring
annual table of fees and services to advisory clients in order to increase transparency for
retail investors and imposing duties of care and loyalty to broker-dealers).
149
See id.
150
Daniel Nathan, Daniel Streim, Nicholas Peterson & Trace Schmeltz, The SECs
Regulation Best Interest: How to Prepare for the New Standard of Conduct, A.B.A. (June
19,
2019),
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Interest on any state law governing the relationship between regulated
entities and their customers will be determined in future judicial

                 151 Thus,
much remains unknown as to how Regulation Best Interest will be
implemented and enforced by states and self-regulatory organizations like
FINRA.

C. Thinking Ahead: Reasonable Solutions to Regulation Best
Interest
While the fate of Regulation Best Interest is unclear, the potential June
2020 compliance deadline is quickly approaching, and investor confusion
persists as to the different standards of care between broker- dealers and
            
broker-dealer standard of conduct by aligning a broker-     
               
enforcement and teeth to hold broker-dealers to a best interest standard.
Particularly because the rule fails to expand on consumer protections and
add clarity to the broker vs. advisor roles.
Yet, in the midst of the grey areas left by the Regulation Best Interest,
firms should work diligently together to achieve a successful compliance
framework.152 By developing policies and procedures that provide a higher
standard of care to their investors, firms can not only educate their
investors on the differences between broker-dealers and investment
advisers responsibilities but can also come one step closer towards
satisfying a       153 In doing so, firms are
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/securities/practice/2019/howto-prepare-for-new-standard-of-conduct-regulation-best-interest/ (advising that states that
have extended fiduciary obligations to broker-dealers should observe the higher state
standard until the judiciary branch determines whether Regulation Best Interest displaces
those state laws).
151
Reg BI Release, supra note 10, at 515 n. 1163 (explaining that there are unknown
factors which keep the SEC from deciding whether Regulation Best Interest should
preempt state law such as: (1) the final language in any proposed state legislation; (2)
whether the language would constitute the type of law, rule, or regulation that is expressly
preempted by the securities law; and (3) whether, if there was any preemption, that
preclusion of state law would have any positive or negative effects on investors when
compared with the effects of Regulation Best Interest).
152
Ghillaine Reid and Kurt Wolfe, Firms Should Stay Course Amid New Broker Standard
(Sep.
25,
2019,
3:12
PM),
Suits,
LAW360
https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/92c04248-9a52-4171-8fa72ef327a3bf63/?context=1000516 (advising that for firms who compliance efforts are
underway should stay in the course of compliance regardless of the current lawsuits seeking
to set the regulation aside).
153
Id. (explaining that while the SEC and states have not agreed to a uniform fiduciary
standard, by designing and implementing policies and procedures that comply with the
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likely to conform their conduct as closely as possible to the Regulation
Best Interest standard.154
Moreover, while the SEC refused to provide further guidance as to
             
initiated by FINRA might be a viable solution towards addressing the gaps
left by Regulation Best Interest.155 For instance, the campaign could
provide more details as to when a broker-        ered
              SEC
mentioned it would apply a totality of the circumstances test, having a
more comprehensive explanation as to what the limits are, can help
investors decipher when a fiduciary duty is owed to them. The campaign
can also help educate investors as to when and under what circumstances
a broker-dealer is required to monitor an account. Doing so would help
                
a dual registrant must do when providing investment advice.
Further, while the SEC has failed to clarify whether state fiduciary
rules would preempt the federally promulgated Regulation Best Interest, a
workable solution might be for states to follow state promulgated fiduciary
standards since they impose a higher ethical duty for broker-dealers when
compared to Regulation Best Interest.156 If states with fiduciary rules
follow them, they will certainly meet the four obligation under Regulation
Best Interest which include: (i) Disclosure Obligation, (ii) Care
Obligation, (iii) Conflict of Interest Obligation, and (iv) Compliance
Obligation. Consequently, it is unlikely that broker-dealers in such states
will encounter a problem for choosing to put their state fiduciary rules first.
Likewise, another feasible solution might be for more states to enforce a
state fiduciary rule. Doing so would help narrow the gap that exists in retail
              -dealers and investment
advisers. Many states such as Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, and
New York have already done so at a local level and are one step closer
towards achieving a uniform fiduciary standard.157

most restrictive regulatory requirements, firms can establish a single internal standard that
applies to all securities transactions where the broker-dealer or investment adviser
recommends securities or investment strategies to retail investors).
154
Id.
155
Daniel Nathan, Daniel Streim, Nicholas Peterson & Trace Schmeltz, supra note 150
(clarifying that in its adoption of Regulation Best Interest, the SEC largely left the term
best interest undefined since it solely explained the four obligations under the rule).
156
See Ross Jordan, Thinking Before Rulemaking: Why The SEC Should Think Twice
Before Imposing a Uniform Fiduciary Standard on Broker-Dealers and Investment
Advisers, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 491, 505 (2012).
157
DeRose et al., supra note 146.
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V. CONCLUSION
The problem of conflicting standards for broker-dealers and
investment advisers has troubled the financial services industry for way
too long. For years, main street investors have been left unprotected and
confused about the different legal obligations and standard of conduct
broker-dealers and investment advisers carry when making investment
recommendations. As financial services firms turned to a dually
registration model, investor confusion widened. Dual registration allowed
firms to offer both advisory and broker-dealer services to investors while
their employees adhered to different standards of conduct based on the
services provided. Accordingly, the dually registered model further
blurred the lines that existed between investment advisers and brokerdealer responsibilities.
In its decision to pass Regulation Best Interest, the SEC sought to
finally put investors first. The Commission adopted a package of rules and
interpretations that would enhance the quality and transparency of retail
!'"-dealers and investment advisers. The
regulation brought legal requirements and mandated disclosures for
broker-dealers and investment advisers in line with reasonable investor
expectations. By enhancing the current suitability standard under FINRA
Rule 2111, the SEC hoped to improve the efficiency of the
recommendations broker-   '
initiative to choose Main Street over Wall Street fell short.
Though Regulation Best Interest requires that a broker-dealer must act
 'nd cannot place its interest ahead of
its customers, its impact on investor protection remains uncertain. While
broker-dealers have until June 30, 2020, to comply, the adopted rule
remains far too ambiguous and has increased investor confusion. In its
adoption of Regulation Best Interest did not explain how a broker-dealer
must go about complying with the rule. The rule also did not address
whether Regulation Best Interest would preempt state fiduciary rules.
Since many states have already extended fiduciary obligations to brokerdealers, whether Regulation Best Interest will displace those state laws is
likely to be determined through litigation.
 $   '
quickly approaching, possible feasible solutions include: (i) firms working
together to achieve a compliance framework by developing policies and
procedures that achieve a higher standard of care for broker-dealer; (ii)
FINRA providing further guidance to firms and investors as to what
constitutes % &  %$  !& $ !
# '
to follow their state fiduciary rules despite the Regulation Best Interest;
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and (iv) promoting other states to implement local/ state fiduciary rules.
Thus, by implementing the mentioned solutions, states, firm, and
regulators could once and for all help narrow the gap that currently exists
between broker-           
expectations.

